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5 EPIC notes that "Advertisers are no longer limited to buying an ad on a targeted website because they instead pay companies to follow people around on the internet wherever they go.
Companies then use this information to decide what credit-card o¤ers or product pricing to show people, potentially leading to price discrimination." ("Online Tracking and Behavioral Pro…ling" at http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online_tracking_and_behavioral.html). 6 In electronic commerce there is evidence of both discrimination based on consumer locations and ‡exibility. Mikians et al. (2012) …nd that some sellers returned di¤erent prices to consumers depending on whether a consumer accessed a seller's website directly or through price aggregators and discount sites (like nextag.com). Those price di¤erences can be explained through di¤erences in price sensitivity ( ‡exibility) of the two types of consumers. Consumers accessing a seller's website through price aggregators are likely to be more price-sensitive. Similarly, vice president of corporate a¤airs at Orbitz Worldwide Inc., which operates a website for travel booking, said that "Many hotels have proven willing to provide discounts for mobile sites."(Valentino-Devries et al., 2012). The latter can also be explained as price discrimination based on consumer ‡exibility since smartphone users 2 Second, customer data is widely used to decide on the optimal store location. 7 In this article we consider a Hotelling model, where consumers di¤er both in their locations and transport cost parameters. There are two …rms which compete in prices and have access to perfect data on consumers locations. Additionally, …rms may acquire data on consumer ‡exibility of an exogenously given quality, which allows them to distinguish between di¤erent ‡exibility segments and attribute every consumer to one of them. We consider two versions of our model depending on how strongly consumers di¤er in ‡exibility, with relatively homogeneous
and di¤erentiated consumers. We analyze …rms'location choices in the two versions of our model depending on the quality of customer ‡exibility data.
Our article contributes to the literature on spatial competition in Hotelling-type models where …rms …rst choose locations and then compete in prices given the ability to practice perfect third-degree price discrimination based on consumer addresses. The famous result in Lederer and Hurter (1986) states that in the latter case in equilibrium every …rm chooses its location so as to minimize social costs equal to the minimal costs of serving a consumer at each address.
In a standard Hotelling model (with a uniform distribution of consumers along a line segment) this result implies socially optimal equilibrium locations. Hamilton and Thisse (1992) introduce a vertical dimension of consumer heterogeneity along which …rms can practice …rst-degree price discrimination. They get the same optimality result as in Lederer and Hurter and conclude that "...we see that the Hurter-Lederer e¢ cient location result relies on perfectly inelastic consumer demands. For …rms to locate e¢ ciently when demands are price-sensitive, they need more ‡ex-ibility in pricing..." (Hamilton and Thisse, 1992 , p. 184) On the one hand, our results support this conclusion, as we show that when the quality of customer ‡exibility data improves (and …rms can identify more ‡exibility segments) equilibrium locations become closer to the socially optimal ones. However, this happens only when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated in ‡ex-ibility. With relatively homogeneous consumers in equilibrium …rms choose socially optimal locations regardless of their ability to discriminate based on consumer ‡exibility. Our results imply that in a model with price-sensitive demands at each address socially optimal locations can be considered as more price-sensitive due to the availability of di¤erent mobile applications, which collect special o¤ers depending on a user's location. The evidence of price discrimination based on consumer locations is provided in Valentino-Devries et al. (2012) who …nd the strongest correlation between the di¤erences in online prices and the distance to a rival's store from the center of a ZIP Code of a buyer.
can be an equilibrium under weaker requirements on the quality of customer data available to the …rms than perfect data.
Valletti (2001) is another article, which introduces heterogeneity along the vertical dimension of consumer preferences and assumes that consumers can be of two types depending on their valuation for quality. While …rms can practice perfect third-degree price discrimination based on consumer addresses, they do not observe their types and, hence, have to rely on second-degree price discrimination at each address. Valletti shows that …rms'location choices in ‡uence their discriminating ability. Di¤erent from Valletti, in our model …rms'ability to discriminate is given exogenously and depends on the quality of customer ‡exibility data, such that a …rm's location choice in ‡uences only its market share (along the horizontal dimension of consumer preferences) and the pro…t on a given location. Our results show that for the same data quality …rms make di¤erent location choices depending on how strongly consumers di¤er in ‡exibility.
Overall, our article contributes to Hamilton and Thisse (1992) and Valletti (2002) by introducing third-degree price discrimination along the vertical dimension of consumer preferences enabled by customer data, while the former assume …rst-degree and the latter considers seconddegree price discrimination.
Our article is also related to Anderson and de Palma (1988) who assume that products are heterogeneous not only in the spatial dimension, but also in the characteristic space, which also leads to price-sensitive demands at each location. Similar to Anderson and de Palma we show that socially optimal prices and locations are not always an equilibrium, in contrast to models where only spatial dimension of heterogeneity is considered. However, di¤erent from Anderson and de Palma, we show that socially optimal prices and locations can also be an equilibrium in a model with price-sensitive demands. This happens in two cases. First, if consumers are relatively homogeneous in transport cost parameters. Second, if …rms have perfect data on consumer ‡exibility and, hence, can perfectly discriminate along that dimension. The intuition for our results is as follows. When consumers are relatively homogeneous, in equilibrium every …rm serves all consumers on its turf, even when …rms do not hold data on consumer ‡exibility.
This happens because if a …rm targets at some address its most loyal customer (with the highest transport cost parameter), it su¢ ce to decrease the price slightly to gain even the least loyal customer (with the lowest transport cost parameter). As a result, similar to Lederer and Hurter (1986) , every …rm chooses its location so as to minimize social (transport) costs, which implies socially optimal locations. However, when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated, in equilibrium on any address on its turf a …rm serves only the more loyal consumers and loses the less loyal ones to the rival. To mitigate competition …rms deviate from the socially optimal locations, and the inter…rm distance is larger in equilibrium compared to both the …rst-best and the second-best. With the improvement in the quality of customer ‡exibility data distortions in …rms' equilibrium locations become smaller, because every …rm can better target consumers on its turf, which weakens the rival's ability to attract its loyal consumers. When ‡exibility data becomes perfect, …rms make socially optimal location choices with relatively di¤erentiated consumers too.
Tabuchi (1994) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) space who show that the Nash equilibrium implies maximal di¤erentiation only in the dominant product characteristic. While in our model products di¤er only in one (horizontal) dimension, we introduce consumer heterogeneity in the strength of their preferences along that dimension.
In contrast, in Tabuchi and Irmen and Thisse it is assumed that the transport cost parameters related to each product characteristic are same among all consumers. We show that …rms' location choices depend on how strongly consumers di¤er in transport cost parameters and …rms'ability to discriminate along that dimension of consumer preferences.
Finally, our article is related to Jenzsch, and . Both articles assume that consumers di¤er in the strength of their brand preferences. In the former article the authors analyze …rms'incentives to share di¤erent types of customer data depending on how strongly consumers di¤er in ‡exibility. In the latter paper the authors analyze …rms' incentives to acquire customer ‡exibility data depending on its quality and consumer heterogeneity along that dimension. The focus of our article is the analysis of …rms'location choices depending on the quality of customer ‡exibility data and on how strongly consumers di¤er in ‡exibility.
Our article is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. In Section 3
we provide the equilibrium analysis, state our results and compare them in detail with Lederer and Hurter (1986) and Anderson and de Palma (1988) . Finally, in Section 4 we conclude. 5 
The Model
We analyze Bertrand competition between two …rms, A and B, located at 0 d A 1 and 0 d B 1 on a unit-length Hotelling line, respectively. Firms produce the same product of two di¤erent brands, A and B, respectively. There is a unit mass of consumers, each buying at most one unit of the product. We follow Jenzsch, and assume that consumers are heterogeneous not only in locations, but also in transport cost parameters ( ‡exibility). Each consumer is uniquely characterized by a pair (x; t), where x 2 [0; 1] denotes a consumer's address and t 2 t; t her transport cost parameter, with t > t 0. We assume that x and t are uniformly and independently distributed with density functions f x (x) = 1 and f t (t) = 1= t t , to which we will refer as f t , respectively. If a consumer does not buy at her location, she has to incur linear transport costs proportional to the distance to the …rm. The utility of a consumer (x; t) from buying at …rm i = A; B at price p i is
where v > 0 is the basic utility, which is assumed to be high enough such that all consumers buy in equilibrium. A consumer buys from a …rm, which delivers her a higher utility. In case of equal utilities we assume that a consumer buys from a closer …rm. 8 Firms know perfectly the location of each consumer in the market and can discriminate among consumers respectively. Firms can also acquire ‡exibility data, which is imperfect. To model imperfect customer data we follow Liu and Serfes (2004) and and assume that data quality is characterized by the exogenously given parameter k = 0; 1; 2; :::; 1. This data allows a …rm to identify 2 k ‡exibility segments and allocate each consumer to one of them. Segment m = 1; 2; :::; 2 k consists of consumers with transport cost pa-
denote the most and the least ‡exible consumers on segment m, respectively. With the improvement in data quality (k becomes larger), …rms are able to allocate consumers to …ner ‡exibility segments. If k ! 1, a …rm with ‡exibility data knows perfectly the location and transport cost parameter of each consumer in the market and can charge individual prices. Otherwise, a …rm has to charge group prices (to consumers with the same address and on the same ‡exibility segment). With p im (x), i = fA; Bg, we will denote the price of …rm i on address x on segment m.
Following Jenzsch, Sapi and Suleymanova (2013) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013) we will consider two extreme versions of our model with respect to consumer heterogeneity in ‡exibility, measured by the ratio l := t=t. In the version with relatively homogeneous consumers we assume that t > 0 and t=t 2. In the version with relatively di¤ erentiated consumers we assume that t = 0, in which case lim t!0 t=t = 1. In a similar way we can distinguish between ‡exibility segments. Precisely, we will say that consumers on segment m are relatively homogeneous if Stage 2 (Flexibility data acquisition and prices). Firms decide simultaneously and independently from each other whether to acquire ‡exibility data and choose prices to di¤erent consumer groups.
Equilibrium Analysis
We solve for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and start from the second stage. Similar to Liu and Serfes (2007) , both …rms acquire customer data in equilibrium, because by refraining from data acquisition a …rm cannot in ‡uence the decision of the rival to acquire customer data and only decreases its degrees of freedom in pricing. We next analyze …rms'optimal prices given their location choices in the …rst stage. Without loss of generality we will assume that the …rm which is located closer to x = 0 is …rm A, such that
Stage 2: Prices. As …rms know consumer addresses, they can charge di¤erent prices on each location. It is useful to consider separately four intervals of the unit line: i) interval
consumers between the two …rms, which are closer to …rm A, iii) interval
with consumers between the two …rms, which are closer to …rm B, iv) interval x > d B , which constitutes the hinterland of …rm B. In the following we will refer to the intervals i) and ii) as "the turf of …rm A" and to consumers there as "loyal consumers of …rm A." Symmetrically, we will refer to the intervals iii) and iv) as "the turf of …rm B" and to consumers there as "loyal consumers of …rm B."
We consider …rst the turf of …rm A, which consists of consumers located closer to …rm A.
Under moderate prices only consumers with relatively small transport cost parameters switch to …rm B, because buying from the farther …rm is not very costly for them. On interval x d A on some segment m these are consumers with 
, then on segment m the transport cost parameter of the indi¤erent consumer is
. Those consumers buy from …rm A, who have relatively high transport cost parameters:
depends on the address of the indi¤erent consumer.
Precisely, when x increases, for given …rms'prices the transport cost parameter of the indi¤erent 8 consumer becomes larger. If a consumer is located close to …rm B, she may …nd it optimal to buy from …rm B even if she has a relatively high transport cost parameter.
Consider now the turf of …rm B. On address
the transport cost parameter of the indi¤erent consumer is
On both intervals those consumers buy from …rm B who have relatively high transport cost parameters: t e t( ).
Each …rm maximizes its pro…t separately on each address x and each segment m. For example, on some x d A and some m …rm A solves the optimization problem
where im ( j x d A ) denotes the pro…t of …rm i = fA; Bg on address x d A on segment m.
The optimization problem of …rm B is
In the following lemma we state …rms'equilibrium prices, demand regions and pro…ts depending on their location choices in the …rst stage of the game in the version of our model with relatively di¤erentiated consumers. We will use the subscripts "d" and "h" to denote the equilibrium values in the versions of our model with relatively di¤erentiated and homogeneous consumers, respectively.
Lemma 1 (Stage 2: optimal prices. Relatively di¤ erentiated consumers). Assume that con-sumers are relatively di¤ erentiated in ‡exibility. Equilibrium prices and demand regions depend on consumer's address, ‡exibility segment and the quality of customer ‡exibility data.
i) Consider some x in the hinterland of …rm i = fA; Bg. On m = 1 …rms charge prices
where …rm i serves consumers with t t= 3 2 k , j = fA; Bg and i 6 = j. On m 2 …rms charge
where …rm i serves consumers with t t= 3 2 k , j = fA; Bg and i 6 = j. Firms'
where …rm i serves all consumers.
Firms realize pro…ts
Proof. See Appendix. On segment m = 1, where consumers are relatively di¤erentiated, …rm A follows a so-called market-sharing strategy, such that its best-response function takes the form
To monopolize segment m = 1 …rm A has to charge a price equal to that of the rival, because the most ‡exible consumer (with t 1 = 0) can switch brands costlessly. The best-response function (1) shows that …rm A …nds it optimal to monopolize segment m = 1 only if the rival's price is relatively high:
, …rm A optimally charges a higher price and loses the more ‡exible consumers. To attract the loyal consumers of the rival …rm B charges in equilibrium a low price
, which makes the market-sharing outcome optimal for …rm A.
In contrast, on segments m 2, where consumers are relatively homogeneous, …rm A follows a so-called monopolization strategy, such that its best-response function takes the form
is the highest price, which allows …rm A to monopolize segment m on some address x d A on its turf for a given price of the rival, p Bm (x). As the best-response function (2) shows, regardless of the rival's price …rm A prefers to charge a relatively low price to serve all consumers on segment m. As a result, in equilibrium …rm B cannot do better than charging the price of zero. Firm A serves all consumers on segment m although it charges a positive price there.
The type of the equilibrium strategy of a …rm on some ‡exibility segment on its turf, marketsharing or monopolization, depends on how strongly consumers di¤er there in ‡exibility. When consumers are relatively homogeneous on some segment, it su¢ ce for a …rm to decrease slightly the price targeted at the least ‡exible consumer to serve all consumers there, such that regardless of the rival's price a …rm …nds it optimal to monopolize the segment. In contrast, when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated on a given segment, serving all consumers there requires a substantial reduction in the price targeted at the least ‡exible consumer (because the most ‡exible consumer can switch brands costlessly), which makes the monopolization outcome optimal only when the rival's price (which serves as an anchor for a …rm's price) is high enough.
It is also worth noting that the equilibrium distribution of consumers between the …rms depends only on which …rm's turf and on which ‡exibility segment (with relatively homogeneous or di¤erentiated consumers) they are located. Precisely, in equilibrium all consumers on segments m 2 buy from their preferred …rms and on segment m = 1 one third of the more ‡exible consumers switches to the less preferred …rm. 9 However, the equilibrium prices of a …rm on its turf depend also on whether a consumer is located between the two …rms or in its hinterland.
Precisely, to consumers on the same segment on its turf a …rm charges a higher price if they are located in its hinterland because switching to the other …rm is more costly for them. In the next lemma we characterize the equilibrium of the second stage of the game in the version of our model with relatively homogeneous consumers.
Lemma 2 (Stage 2: optimal prices. Relatively homogeneous consumers). Assume that consumers are relatively homogeneous in ‡exibility. Equilibrium prices and demand regions depend on consumer's address, ‡exibility segment and the quality of customer ‡exibility data.
i) Consider some x in the hinterland of …rm i = fA; Bg. On m 1 …rms charge prices
where …rm i serves all consumers, j = fA; Bg and i 6 = j.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the version of our model with relatively homogeneous consumers, consumers are relatively homogeneous on any ‡exibility segment for any quality of customer data. As we showed above, in that case every …rm follows a monopolization strategy on any segment on its turf. As a result, the rival charges the prices of zero on a …rm's turf and serves no consumers there. We next analyze …rms'location choices given their optimal prices in the second stage of the game. ii) If consumers are relatively di¤ erentiated, then in equilibrium …rms choose locations:
where
t 9 2 2k 9 2 k + 10 2 27 2 2k 27 2 k + 22 9 2 2k+5 (9 2 2k 9 2 k + 8)
In the following we will explain and provide intuition for our results in each version of our model using the approach of Lederer and Hurter (1986, in the following: LH).
Comparison with LH: Relatively homogeneous consumers. When consumers are relatively homogeneous, …rms make socially optimal location choices, such that the equilibrium locations coincide with both …rst-best and second-best locations. This result is driven by the fact that every …rm follows a monopolization strategy on any address on its turf. As a result, in equilibrium every …rm serves all consumers on its turf and charges on any address the highest price, which allows to monopolize a given ‡exibility segment. This price is proportional to the di¤erence in the distances between the consumer and each of the …rms. Following LH and using the results of Lemma 2 we can state the equilibrium prices of …rm i = fA; Bg as
Then the equilibrium pro…t of …rm i for given locations d i and d j can be written as
where i 6 = j and j = fA; Bg. Similar to Lemma 4 in LH we can rewrite
Hence, when …rm i chooses the optimal location its optimization problem is equivalent to
Following LH, we can de…ne the expression t + t h R 1
as social transport costs, which are the total transport costs incurred by consumers when they are served by …rms in a cooperative manner minimizing transport costs. The latter implies that every consumer buys from the closer …rm. It follows from (4) that the location choice of …rm i minimizes social transport costs given the location of the rival, d j , yielding …rst-best locations in equilibrium. 10 ' 11 Equilibrium locations also coincide with the second-best locations. The latter minimize transport costs given the equilibrium allocation of consumers, which in the case of homogeneous consumers implies that every consumer buys from the closer …rm. Hence, second-best locations also minimize social transport costs. Indeed, they solve the optimization
which is equivalent to the problem
Comparison with LH: Relatively di¤erentiated consumers. When consumers are relatively di¤erentiated, equilibrium locations di¤er both from …rst-best and second-best locations.
Precisely, compared to both the …rst-best and the second-best, in equilibrium the inter…rm distance is larger. Only when the quality of ‡exibility data becomes perfect, the equilibrium locations coincide with both …rst-best and second-best locations. In that case in equilibrium every …rm serves all consumers on its turf on any address, and we get the same results as in the case with relatively homogeneous consumers. When the quality of ‡exibility data is imperfect, as shown in Lemma 1, given any locations every …rm serves on its own turf the more loyal consumers and the less loyal consumers on the rival's turf. In a similar way as above, following 1 0 To be more precise, in our case the equilibrium location of a …rm minimizes directly the total distance travelled by consumers. In LH the equilibrium location of a …rm minimizes directly social transport costs (if production costs are zero). This di¤erence is related to the fact that in our model …rms do not know the transport cost parameter of an individual consumer unless k ! 1. Then in equilibrium in the version with relatively homogeneous consumers every consumer pays a price equal to the di¤erence in the distances between the consumer and the two …rms multiplied by the transport cost parameter of the most ‡exible consumer on the segment to which consumer belongs, and not consumer's own transport cost parameter. However, this di¤erence between LH and our model does not change the main result that with relatively homogeneous consumers …rms make socially optimal location choices.
LH and using the results of Lemma 1 we can state the equilibrium prices of …rm i = fA; Bg as
Then the pro…t of …rm i for given locations d i and d j can be written as
Similar to Lemma 4 in LH we can rewrite
Hence, when …rm i chooses location d i , its optimization problem is equivalent to
where (k) = 2= 9 2 k 2 k 1 + 8 . Di¤erent from the optimization problem with relatively homogeneous consumers (4), where every …rm minimizes social transport costs, in the optimization problem (6) …rm i minimizes the weighted di¤erence between social transport costs and transport costs of buying at …rm i given by the …rst and the second terms in (6), respectively.
Compared to the case of relatively homogeneous consumers, the latter term is new and is driven by the incentive of a …rm to locate further apart from the rival to mitigate competition under the imperfect ability of a …rm to protect market shares on its turf. Consider, for example, …rm
A. For a given location of the rival, the location choice which minimizes social transport costs is
. And the location choice, which maximizes the transport costs of buying at …rm
k) which solves (6), takes some value between
and d A = 0. As …rst-best locations solve the optimization problem
it is straightforward that compared to them, equilibrium locations are closer to the end points of the unit interval and the inter…rm distance is larger in equilibrium than in the …rst-best.
Second-best locations minimize the transport costs
where (k) = 1= 9 2 2k . Di¤erent from …rst-best locations, which minimize social transport costs, second-best locations minimize the weighted sum of the social transport costs and the maximal transport cost given by the …rst and the second terms in (7), respectively. The …rst term in (7) is the transport costs of consumers who buy from their preferred …rms, and the second term in (7) is the transport costs of consumers who buy from the farther …rms. The latter costs are minimized under minimal di¤erentiation when both …rms are located at the middle of the unit interval. 12 Then second-best locations are closer to the middle of the unit interval compared to …rst-best locations, and the inter…rm distance is larger in equilibrium than in the second-best too.
Combing our results in both versions of our model we make the following conclusions on …rms' location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, where …rms 1 2 Note that
It is straightforward to show that the values dA = dB = 1=2 solve the following constrained optimization problem:
, s.t. dA dB 0, dA 0 and dB 1.
can practice perfect third-degree price discrimination based on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect one based on consumer ‡exibility. First, …rms choose socially optimal locations in two cases. If either consumers are relatively homogeneous in ‡exibility or if …rms have perfect customer ‡exibility data and thus can practice perfect third-degree price discrimination along that dimension too. In both cases every …rm serves all consumers on its turf. We conclude that the optimality result of LH may also hold when customer data is imperfect. Second, when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated in ‡exibility and customer ‡exibility data is imperfect, …rms make socially suboptimal location choices. However, with the improvement in the quality of customer data equilibrium locations become closer to the socially optimal ones. This result supports the intuition of Hamilton and Thisse (1984, p. 184 ) that more ‡exibility in pricing leads to more e¢ cient location choices when demands at each location are price-sensitive. However, as our …rst conclusion shows, ‡exibility in pricing (based on consumer transport cost parameters)
is not a necessary condition for socially optimal locations. In the following we compare our results with the other closely related article of Anderson and de Palma (1988, in the following:
Comparison with AP. AP assume that products are heterogeneous not only in the spatial dimension, but also in the characteristic space, which leads to price-sensitive demands at each location. While both versions of our model imply price-sensitive demands, our results are similar to those of AP only in the version with relatively di¤erentiated consumers, where …rms'markets overlap in equilibrium and most importantly, in equilibrium …rms do not choose optimal locations (apart from the case where …rms can perfectly discriminate based on consumer ‡exibility). As we showed above, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, in equilibrium every …rm serves all consumers on its turf, such that …rms'markets do not overlap, which leads to socially optimal equilibrium locations. 13 In the following we will provide a more detailed comparison of AP and the version of our model with relatively di¤erentiated consumers. In that case the equilibrium prices on segment m = 1 (with relatively di¤erentiated consumers) can be derived from Proposition 1 in AP.
Consider, for example, the interval x d A . 14 We need to set c A = c B = 0 and replace F 1 with the demand of …rm A on segment m = 1:
In AP (in the logit model) equilibrium locations depend on parameter 0, which is interpreted as a measure of consumer/product heterogeneity. In our case it makes sense to de…ne as their demands.
Parameter 1 (k) is inversely related to the quality of customer ‡exibility data. If k = 0, then for any x, 1 (k) gets its highest value of
. Similar to AP we can draw a graph, which represents the optimal location of …rm A depending on the ratio (k) := Figure 1 ). As Figure 1 shows, our results correspond to those in AP where is relatively small ( =cl < b ). Precisely, the …rst-best location of …rm A is constant, the second-best location of …rm A increases in (k) and its equilibrium location decreases in (k). In our model in the …rst best …rms are always located in the …rst and the third quartiles, because the optimal allocation of consumers is driven only by consumer heterogeneity in the spatial dimension, which implies that …rms'markets should not overlap. This is not so in AP, and the socially optimal allocation of consumers depends on both consumer heterogeneity in the spatial dimension and product heterogeneity in the characteristic space. When the latter becomes strong enough, in the …rst best some consumers should buy from the farther …rm, which makes it optimal for the social planer to locate the …rms closer to the middle of the interval to decrease the transport costs of those consumers.
To explain the behavior of the equilibrium locations, AP identify two e¤ects. With an increase in from = 0 in AP products become heterogeneous (at each location) and a …rm loses the monopoly power over its turf. As a result, …rms move further apart to mitigate competition (…rst e¤ ect). At the same time higher implies the increased ability of each …rm to gain consumers on the rival's turf. With an increase in the size of the latter group …rms tend to locate closer to the center to minimize the transport costs of serving those consumers (second e¤ ect). At the point =cl = b in AP the second e¤ect starts to dominate, and the inter…rm distance decreases in equilibrium. When increases from = 0 in our model, a …rm loses the perfect targeting ability on its turf, which allows the rival to gain the less loyal consumers of a …rm. To mitigate competition …rms move further apart according to the …rst e¤ect in AP. On the other hand, the weakened ability of the rival to target consumers on its own turf allows a …rm to gain more consumers there, which creates an incentive to move closer to the rival according to the second e¤ect in AP. However, di¤erent from AP the second e¤ect never dominates in our model, as a …rm gains at most only one third of consumers on the rival's turf. 15 Compared to AP, our analysis highlights the importance of the ability to discriminate along the vertical dimension of consumer preferences for …rms'location choices. When data on consumer ‡exibility improves ( decreases), …rms choose locations as if their products became more homogeneous (at each location), which mitigates competition and pushes the equilibrium locations in the direction of the socially optimal ones. Equilibrium and optimal locations of …rm A depending on (k) 1 5 This result depends on the assumption of the uniform distribution of consumer transport cost parameters on each location. For example, if there were two large consumer groups with relatively high and low transport cost parameters, it could be optimal for a …rm to serve only the former group on its turf, while the latter would switch to the rival. In that case every …rm could serve in equilibrium more loyal consumers of the rival than the own loyal consumers.
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In this article we analyzed …rms'location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters ( ‡exibility). We assumed that …rms have perfect data on consumer locations, while the quality of customer ‡exibility data can be imperfect. Our results show that the optimality result of Lederer and Hurter (1986) holds even when …rms'ability to practice third-degree price discrimination based on consumer transport cost parameters is imperfect, provided consumers are relatively homogeneous along that dimension. In that case under any location choices in equilibrium every …rm serves all consumers on its turf, as in the case where …rms have perfect data on consumer ‡exibility. In contrast, when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated in ‡exibility, …rms make socially suboptimal locations choices (unless the quality of customer ‡exibility data is perfect). However, with the improvement in the quality of customer ‡exibility data …rms'location choices become closer to the socially optimal ones. This result supports the intuition of Hamilton and Thisse (1992) that to make socially optimal location choices …rms need more ‡exibility in pricing. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows …rms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters. It highlights the importance of consumer heterogeneity in ‡exibility and the quality of customer ‡exibility data for …rms'location choices.
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Proof of Lemma 1. As …rms are symmetric, we will derive equilibrium on the two intervals on the turf of …rm A. 
such that consumers with t e t( ) buy at …rm A. Consider …rst m = 1. Maximization of …rms' expected pro…ts yields the best-response functions
and
Given the best-response functions (10) and (11) we conclude that two types of equilibria are possible, where either …rm A monopolizes segment m or where both …rms serve consumers. Only the latter equilibrium exists where …rms charge prices
Consider now segments m 2, where the best-response function of …rm A is
As t m (k) 2t m (k) 0 for any m 2, there is no p Bm (x) 0 under which it is optimal for …rm A to share the market with …rm B. 
On the interval x d A …rms realize pro…ts
Using symmetry we conclude on …rms'pro…ts on the interval x d B :
The transport cost parameter of the indi¤erent consumer is
, provided e t( ) 2 t m (k); t m (k) . Firm A serves consumers with t e t( ). Consider …rst m = 1.
Maximization of …rms'pro…ts yields the best-response functions
Given the best-response functions (13) and (14) we conclude that two types of equilibria are possible where either …rm A serves all consumers on segment m or shares it with the rival. Only the latter equilibrium exists, where …rms charge prices
On m = 1 …rm A serves consumers with t t= 3 2 k .
We now consider m 2, where the best-response function of …rm A takes the form
such that …rm A never …nds it optimal to share segment m with …rm B. Applying the logic described in part i) of the proof, we conclude that
). Firm A serves all consumers on any segment m 2 on address x.
Using symmetry, we can conclude on …rms'pro…ts on the interval
Summing up …rms'pro…ts on all the four intervals we get
Proof of Lemma 2. As …rms are symmetric, we will only derive equilibrium on the two intervals on the turf of …rm A and then conclude on the equilibrium on the turf of …rm B.
Consider some x d A and some m 1. The transport cost parameter of the indi¤erent consumer is
The best-response function of …rm A is 
, provided e t( ) 2 t m (k); t m (k) . Firm A serves consumers with t e t( ). The best-response function of …rm A is
Following the logic applied in part i) of the proof we conclude that
=2) = 0 and the pro…t of …rm A is computed as
Summing up the pro…ts (16) and (17) we get the pro…ts of …rm A as stated in the lemma.
The pro…ts of …rm B are derived using symmetry. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. We …rst derive …rst-best locations and prices. We will proceed in two steps. We will …rst derive …rst-best prices for any given locations and then will …nd …rst-best locations. Assume that …rms are located at d A d B . Social welfare is maximized when every consumer buys from the closer …rm. Prices, which yield such a distribution of consumers between the …rms are p F B im (x) ; p F B jm (x) 0 such that
Given (18), the …rst-best locations, d F B A and d F B B , have to minimize the transport costs We now consider the case of relatively di¤erentiated consumers. According to Lemma 1, on its own turf each …rm serves consumers with t t= 3 2 k , while consumers with t < t= 3 2 k switch to the rival. Then second-best locations have to minimize the transport costs 
Note that SOCs are ful…lled. To prove that these locations constitute indeed the equilibrium, 
